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can be obtained in equity only. In cases in which the jurisdiction of
law and equity is concurrent, the Florida law is unsettled. The Florida
Court, in suits not falling within the above categories, will apparently
use the statute as a guide in determining the upper limit of mere
delay that will constitute laches.
In view of the apparent uncertainty, the Legislature might well
consider the advisability of providing a more concrete guide for
determining when statutes of limitation are to be applied to suits in
equity. Much useless litigation can be avoided thereby if prospective
complainants know that there is no chance of recovery in equity if
there is none at law. Until this problem is settled, many optimistic
complainants will be certain that their cases possess such equities that
the chancellor will not apply a limitations statute to bar their suits.
GEORGE EARL BROWN

IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT CASES ON EDUCATION

OF MINORITY RACIAL GROUPS
Racial segregation, as such, has never been declared violative of
the United States Constitution.' Racial discrimination by a state in
the exercise of its power, however, has repeatedly been held void. The systematic exclusion of colored citizens from jury service,3 the
refusal of voting privileges in primaryN4 or general elections, 5 and the
exclusion from the ownership or occupancy of property,G for example,
'For a well-developed article see Waite, The Negro in the Supreme Court,
30 MiNN, L. REv. 219 (1946).
2bid.

3Cassell v, Texas, 70 Sup. Ct. 629 (1950) (Jury Commissioner's selection
of jurymen from those citizens that he knew were qualified, together with his
limited personal knowledge of potentially qualified negro jurors, would inevitably
imply designed exclusion of eligible Negroes); Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400
(1942); Smith v. Texas, 811 U. S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 806 U. S.
354 (1939); Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1900); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U. S. 303 (1879).
4
Nixon v, Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 278 U, S. 536
(1927).
5Lane v. Wilson, 807 U. S. 268 (1939); Gunn v. United States, 238 U. S.
847 (1915).
6Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Buchanan v. NVarley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917); 1 U. or FLA. L. REv. 453 (1948).
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all violate the Federal Constitution. Racial segregation on public
carriers 7 or in public schools8 is not a denial of equal protection of
the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, although in regard to
transportation a recent decision interpreting a provision of the Interstate Commerce Commission Act 9 apparently prevents segregation
of the races in dining cars of railroads engaged in interstate
commerce.' 0
IisTORY

I.

OF RACIAL SEGREGATION IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1870, Negro
education in Southern states has become a problem of increasing
importance." While public education has always been within the
peculiar province of state governments, 1 2 state action is necessarily
limited by the fact that the Constitution of the United States grants
to all citizens certain minimum protections against state action.' 3
Prior to 1870, segregation of races in the public schools was valid
and did -not necessarily imply racial inferiority. 1 4 Many subsequent
opinions reiterated this principle even after the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In one of the earliest opinions discussing

the problem, a federal court stated: 15
"Any classification which preserves substantially equal school
advantages does not impair any rights, and is not prohibited
by the constitution of the United States. Equality of rights does

not necessarily imply identity of rights."
7

McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. By., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
954 STAT. 902 (1940); 49 U.S.C. §3(1) (1946).
lOHenderson v. United States, 70 Sup. Ct. 843 (1950); accord, Mitchell v.
United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
"1See SmpmENs, THE Soum OLD AND Nav 276-277 (1947); STUDns iNr
SovTHmm Hisioay AND PoLrncs 281-287 (1914).
12 Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899); Ward v. Flood,
48 Cal. 86 (1874).
13Adamson v. California, 832 U.S. 46 (1947); Slaughter-House Cases, 16
Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873).
' 4Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1849).
luBertonneau v. Board of Directors of City Schools, 3 Fed. Cas. 294, 296
No. 1,361 (C.C.D. La. 1878); Wong Him v. Callahan, 119 Fed. 381 (C.C.N.D.
Cal. 1902); Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66 Kan. 672, 72 Pac. 274 (1906).
8
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The Supreme Court of the United States did not consider the issue
of segregation until 1927, with the case of Gong Lun v. Rice.1"' The
Court, following a dictum advanced in 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson,'7
upheld the legality of segregation of races in public schools, 1 provided equal facilities were furnished.
Quite generally, equal facilities have been determined by measuring tangible physical factors"9 such as number of pupils per teacher
and number of square feet of floor space per pupil. 20 Inconvenience
to individual members of the Negro race because of the location of
their school is insufficient to support charges of inequality under the
Constitution. " ' If, however, the location is more dangerous or more
inconvenient to all Negro pupils attending than is the comparable
danger or inconvenience to the white pupils as a group, the consti16275 U.S. 78 (1927) (A United States citizen of Chinese extraction was not
denied equal protection of the laws when he was assigned to a separate school,
since equal facilities were afforded in both institutions).
17163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). In condoning the separation of the races under
the police power of a state, the Court cited as the most common instance of that
legal separation the establishment of white and colored schools. It pointed out
that such separation had long been maintained under Congressional legislation in
the District of Columbia. The following cases were cited as upholding such
segregation: Bertonneau v. Board of Directors of City Schools, 3 Fed. Cas. 294,
No. 1,361 (C.C.D. La. 1878); Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 17 Am. Rep. 405
(1874); Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (1874); Dawson v. Lee, 83 Ky. 49 (1884);
State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871); People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438
(1883). See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877), for an early Supreme Court
approval of state segregation decisions.
18
A state statute requiring racial segregation in private schools was upheld
in Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). The case turned on the
state's power over corporations; and by inference the Court indicated that such
a statute would be unconstitutional if applied to persons or associations other
than corporations.
19
Corbin v. County School Bd. of Ed., 177 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1949); Carter
v. School Bd., 87 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Va. 1949); Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66 Kan. 672, 72 Pac. 274 (1903) (a more imposing school building for
whites than for colored was not unequal); Lowery v. School Trustees, 140 N.C.
33, 52 S.E. 267 (1905) (with one white school and one adequate colored
school, an additional building for white students was not discriminatory); State
ex. rel. Lewis v. Board of Education, 7 Ohio Dec. 129 (1876).
20
Carter v. County School Bd., 87 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Va. 1949).
21
Dameron v. Dayless, 14 Ariz. 180, 126 Pac. 273 (1912); Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S.W. 765 (1890); Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (Mass.
1849); People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438 (1883); State ex rel. Lewis v. Board
of Education, 7 Ohio Dec. 129 (1876).
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tutional requirement of equal protection is violated.2 2 This statement,
however, must be limited to those instances in which the treatment
23
afforded might be said to be discriminatory beyond all reason.
Mere variance between Negro and white schools in size, convenience
of location, or methods of instruction is not discrimination that violates the Fourteenth Amendment.2A The attempt to vary the amount

spent on educational facilities for each race with the proportionate
25
amount of taxes paid is invalid under the Federal Constitution.
Although tacitly acknowledging the right of states to maintain
segregated systems of public schools providing equal facilities, the
Supreme Court in recent cases has begun to examine more closely
the requisites necessary for such equality. It has held that a state
must provide substantially equal opportunities for higher education
for both white and Negro students within the state.2 6 Equal facilities,
22

Williams v. Board of Education, 79 Kan. 202, 99 Pac. 216 (1908). The
school was so located that railroad traffic frequently forced the children to
wait long periods of time for trains to pass when en route to and from school
and also interfered with the studies during school hours. The waiting period,
coupled with the long distance from the homes of many of the students, exposed
the Negro children to the elements for much longer periods of time than the
white children. The court held that this treatment was unequal under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
23
Jones v. Board of Education, 90 Okla. 233, 217 Pac. 400 (1923). The
value of the colored school buildings was 1/9th of the total valuation of all
school buildings, although the colored school population was 1/3rd of the
total school population. Further, the school term was 9 months for white children
while only 7 for colored. The Court held that these discrepancies resulted in
discrimination. Rice v. Arnold, 45 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1950), in which a municipality
operating a golf course was held not to discriminate against members of the Negro
race when separate days were allotted to both races in proportion to the number
of golfers of each race using the course as ascertained from previous records, was
reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court and remanded to the Florida Court with instructions to reconsider the case in the light of the Sweatt and McLaurin cases,
19 U.S. LAw WrE 3106 (1950).
24
Carter v. School Board, 87 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Va. 1949).
25Claybrook v. Owensboro, 16 Fed. 297 (D. Ky. 1883). In the jury cases
cited in note 3 supra the Supreme Court has held that under the Federal Constitution there can be no intentional omission from grand or petit juries. This
does not necessarily mean, however, that there must be a proportionate number
of each race upon any particular jury, Op. FLA. ATr'y GEN. 050-229 (June 16,
1950).
26
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (provision for
paying a Negro's transportation to and tuition in a school outside the state held
not to provide equal facilities if white students were offered these facilities
within the state); Wrighten v. University of South Carolina, 72 F. Supp. 948
(1947); University of Maryland v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590 (1936).
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moreover, must be supplied for Negro applicants at the same time
that they are provided for white citizens. " 7 and, in the absence of
equivalent provisions for Negro education, the Negro applicant nlist
be admitted to the existing schools. 28
This was the state of the law on June 5, 1950, when Stccitt c.

Painter29 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Editcation-' were decided by the United States Supreme Court. Th-se
cases are certain to effect major changes it) educational facilitiez
afforded minority racial groups. While not arising on parallel factual
situations, the cases deal with two aspects of the problem of racial
segregation in education: the measure of equality in non-segre- itd
schools and the measure of equality in segregated institutions. The
extent of the changes that will necessarily be required in practice is
not altogether clear as yet, but the cases are subject to possible
limitations. It is the purpose of this note to attempt an objective
analysis of the Sweatt and McLaurin cases.
II.

ThE MEASURE OF EQUALITY IN SEGREGATED SCHOOLS

In Sweatt v. Painter"'the petitioner, a Negro, sought admission to
the University of Texas Law School. The law of Texas prohibited
coeducation of members of the Caucasian and Negroid racc', aid
consequently petitioner's application for admission was rejoted bx
university officials. Sweatt sought a writ of mandamnus to Compel
his admission, contending that no facilities were provided within the
state for his legal education. although they were piovided for miembers of the white race. Texas established an interim school for Negroes
within six months and prior to the Supreme Court's decision a fulltime law school. The former school was rather ob- iouslv inferior to
the University of Texas Law School. but the latter was we!l on the
road to complete accreditation 2 and had 23 students. 5 regular laxw
instructors, a 16,500-volume library serviced by a full-time staff, a
practice court, and a legal aid association. The Texas Supreme Court
27

Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948), 1 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 296 (1948 ).
-SSipuel v. University of Oklaborma, 332 US. 631 (1948).

Sup. Ct. 848 (1950).
31170 Sup. Ct. 851 (1950).
31
See note 29 supra.
32
2970

The full-time school at Houston, Texas, was provisionally approved on
Sept. 8, 1949, by the American Bar Association. Since 1935 all law schools have
been provisionally approved before full approval is given hN the Bar Association, 74 RE-P. Am'rt. BAn Ass'N 155 (1949).
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denied the writ of mandamus on the ground that equal facilities for
the study of law were provided for the members of both races.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Texas court
and held that the facilities afforded the petitioner in neither the
interim nor the full-time law school were equal to those afforded
the members of the white race. The Court pointed out that the
permanent school was not of sufficient size to offer a variety of
courses or the opportunity to specialize; that the reputation of the
school, faculty, and alumni was practically non-existent; that the
insufficient numbers did not allow the students to gain essential
practical experience; 33 and that a substantial group of future lawyers
and clients, namely, the white segment, was excluded from the Negro
school. 3 4 For these reasons the Court concluded that the law school
for Negroes was not in reality equal to the University of Texas Law
School.
The stress placed upon such factors as the exclusion of large segments of the population from the Negro school35 and its lack of
prestige and reputation logically brings this question into view: Can
any two schools, irrespective of segregation, ever attain the equality
that consideration of these intangible factors demands? The answer
is patent; no two schools can ever be exactly the same, considering
all factors, both tangible and intangible. The emphasis placed by the
Court upon the percentage of the citizens of Texas who could not
be admitted to the segregated school logically precludes effective
use of the "separate but equal" doctrine generally conceded to be
the law for a great number of years. If the reasoning of the present
Court is followed in subsequent cases, segregation of educational
facilities does not seem possible beyond the general college level;
and furthermore, if the background of students in general college
work is of sufficient importance to later professional training, the
Court may require in undergraduate studies the same precise equality.
This eventuality would render worthless the time-honored tests of
substantial equality, such as the number of square feet per student
33

Miller, Clinical Training of Law Students, 2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 298 (1950).
1n Carter v. School Bd. of Arlington County, 87 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Va.
1949), however, the exclusion of Negroes from the white school, and the establishment of a separate school for Negroes, resulted in a relatively small student
body in the latter. This factor in turn rendered impracticable a cadet corps, a
football or baseball team, or other activities dependent on numbers; yet no
discrimination was found.
3
5See Hornstein, A Lawyer Looks at the Law School, 1 J. LEcAL EDUC. 517
(1949).
34
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and the number of students per teacher.
The Sweatt case, however, since it concerns the training of students for the legal profession, may be subject to at least three clear
distinctions on the facts. First, a lawyer's success depends, to some
extent at least, upon the feeling in his community that he is skilled
in his chosen profession and that the school he attends is one that
affords adequate instruction. Second, since much of a lawyer's work
necessarily involves interrelationships among members of the state
bar, it is of relatively more importance to a lawyer than to a general
college graduate that he be allowed to associate with prospective
members of his profession during his training. A third possible distinction is that professional techniques developed in school are of
infinite value to the neophyte lawyer. In view of the importance of
these and similar factors in most graduate and professional training,
segregation during such training may well be constitutionally impossible. Whether this doctrine will be extended below the graduate
school level is of course still problematical, but the doubt does not
rest on strictly logical grounds.
The Supreme Court, in deciding Sweatt v. Painter,had two possible
courses: to reconsider Plessy v. Ferguson and decide whether segregation in and of itself is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment, or to reconsider the substantially-equal test and determine its true significance. 36 The Court chose the latter, and found in
effect that precise equality is essential. While this requisite comes
very close to preventing the establishment of truly equal, separate
professional schools, it does not, of course, preclude the states from
37
trying.
36

See Segregation and the Equal Protection Clause. Brief for Committee of
Law Teachers against Segregation in Legal Education, 34 MNN. L. REv. 289

(1950).
37

As an example of this inevitable attempt by the states to seek equality
in segregated professional schools the case of Hawkins v. Board of Control of
Florida, 47 So.2d 608 (1950), recently decided by the Florida Supreme Court,
merits some discussion. The facts in the Hawkins case were similar to those in
the Sweatt case. Hawkins, a Negro, after making application, was denied admission to the University of Florida Law School because of the state constitutional
and statutory provisions which barred the education of the white and colored
races together. Hawkins sought a writ of mandamus to compel his admission
into the University of Florida Law School. No public educational facilities were
provided within the State of Florida for the legal training of Negroes. The
Board of Control, in its return, alleged that substantially equal facilities would
be afforded to the petitioner at a new Negro law school to be established at
Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College for Negroes. The answer further
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III. TRATTumNr

OF NEGROES iN NoN-SEGREGATED ScHooLs

38
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education,
also decided on June 5, 1950, presents a new point of constitutional
law, namely, whether the treatment of Negroes after admission to
non-segregated schools must be equal in the true sense of the word.3 9
This question is important in view of the extreme practical difficulty
of providing equality in separate schools for each of the races, as

indicated by the Sweatt case.

In the McLaurin case the petitioner, who was seeking a doctor's
degree in education, was enrolled in the Graduate School of the

University of Oklahoma. The state legislature gave university officials
the authority to promulgate rules to enforce the state statutory requirement of segregation of races in educational institutions. 40 Accordingly, petitioner was provided a desk within a certain railed area
in each classroom and special tables in both the library and cafeteria
upon which were signs reading, "Reserved for Colored." The railings
and signs denoting the special desks were subsequently removed,
but petitioner was still required to sit in the specified places. The
Supreme Court held that this treatment denied McLaurin on the
alleged that in the event the new school was not in operation at the time the
petitioner desired training he would be allowed to register in the Negro school
and attend the white school temporarily. Hawkins moved for a peremptory
writ notwithstanding this answer, and the Court quite properly regarded this
motion as the procedural equivalent of a demurrer, that is, as an admission of
the truth of the allegations of the Board of Control. Accordingly, although the
Florida Supreme Court has specifically retained jurisdiction of the cause, it has
not on these pleadings found any denial of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
While the specific problem of this one case has been temporarily resolved,
the basic question of whether the facilities of the two schools will be equal
remains unanswered. In view of the strictness of the yardstick of equality now
being used by the United States Supreme Court, the admission of Negroes into
the University of Florida Law School is probably the final answer.
n addition to Hawkins v. Board of Control the Florida Supreme Court
reached the same result in four other cases decided on the same day, using as
the rationale the reasoning in the Hawkins case, namely: Finley v. Board of
Control, 47 So.2d 620 (Fla. 1950) (graduate work in agriculture); Boyd v.
Board of Control, 47 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1950) (pharmacy); Maxey v. Board of
Control, 47 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1950) (chemical engineering); Lewis v. Board of
Control, 47 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1950) (law).
3870 Sup. Ct. 851 (1950).
84 90 See State v. Board of Trustees, 126 Ohio St. 290, 185 N.E. 196 (1933).
OarA. STAT. ANN. tit 90, §§455-457 (1950).
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basis of color the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to all
citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court stressed the fact that the statutorily imposed regulations handicapped the petitioner by depriving him of the right to
exchange effectively his ideas with those of the rest of the student
body. The argument presented by the respondents that, irrespective
of state restrictions, the same result would nevertheless be reached
by the voluntary action of the student body was disposed of as
follow s:41

"There is a vast difference-a Constitutional difference-between
restrictions imposed by the state which prohibit the intellectual
commingling of students, and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the state presents no such bar. .

.

. The removal

of the state restrictions will not necessarily abate individual and
group predilections, prejudices and choices. But at the very
least, the state will not be depriving appellant of the opportunity to secure acceptance by his fellow students on his own
merits."
In other words, the Court now considers that an opportunity to
42
commingle, in so far as it affects public education, is a legal right.
Consequently, social restrictions within a public school, if any there
be, must come from sources other than governmental bodies whenever intermingling of the students appears to the Court to be a factor
affecting education.
Although presenting different legal questions, the facts in the
McLaurin case are somewhat similar to those in the Sweatt case. In
both, petitioners were pursuing education beyond what might be
conveniently termed general education: Sweatt was seeking a law
degree; McLaurin, a doctor's degree in education. Likewise, both
cases are concerned with types of education in which close relationships among the students, as well as the exchange of ideas and views,
are essential to a well-rounded course of instruction. For this reason,
distinctions similar to those made in the discussion of the Sweatt
case may also be made here. Essentially the Court, for the first time,
is measuring the value of group atmosphere in determining equality.
41

McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 70 Sup. Ct.
851, 853 (1950).
42
Jones v. Newlon, 81 Colo. 25, 253 Pac. 386 (1927); Patterson v. Board
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The Sweatt and McLaurin cases are certain to affect major changes
in education, particularly in colleges located in the South. The two
cases are, in reality, facets of the same basic problem, namely, the
testing under the Fourteenth Amendment for equality of segregated
educational facilities. The decisions say in effect that, in professional
schools in which factors of atmosphere are of some importance to
the complete, well-rounded training of students, precise equality will
be required for both white and colored citizens. This requirement
supersedes the "substantially equal" doctrine as the test of equality.
The rationale of the Court does not limit the application of this
test to professional schools as such, and no such limitation should be
assumed. The most that can be said by way of limitation is that the
Court may regard these intangible factors as items of lesser importance in public schools below college level, and that separate schools
will be considered equal if the physical facilities for both white
and colored students are comparable. In any given case the measurement of intangible factors will undoubtedly depend upon their importance to the overall education of the student. Certainly the relevance of intangible factors is not limited to professional schools; they
are just as much a part of education in general college work as in
law, albeit to a lesser degree.
As an abstract principle of testing and measuring equal facilities,
the Sweatt and McLaurin cases are undoubtedly sound. Whether
from a policy point of view-which in reality is the basis for the
decisions -the corrective influences could best be accomplished by
43
following the "substantially equal" test is subject to possible doubt.

Because of the social repercussions that would undoubtedly follow
from any general holding that no segregation in public schools is
permissible, the Court wisely limited its decisions to the immediate
cases and issues before it.
NADInE NEIL RFED

of Education, 11 N.J. Misc. 179, 164 AtL 892 (Sup. Ct. 1933); cf. State v.
Board of Trustees, 126 Ohio 290, 185 N.E. 196 (1933).
43
Since individuals cannot be compelled to associate with each other against
their wishes, the true effect of these decisions may well be to deprive colored
students of the participation in college life that they now enjoy in their own
universities. Because of this difficulty, regional education, for example, might
be far more effective from a practical standpoint.
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